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Abstract. Until now, there is no explicit clarity about the question
whether information, as similar to energy and mass, can be visualized
as fundamental constituent of this universe or not, a question which is
presently disputed. We follow here the line of argument which follows
the ﬁrst alternative, and give reasons for this by starting in terms of a
metaphysical conception.
1 The metaphysical perspective
We follow here the traditional line of argument that originates (within the framework
of suﬃciently modern thought) in the substance metaphysics of Spinoza. The basic
idea is to notice that the world is not as we observe it, simply due to the restrictions
which determine the human cognitive capacity. The fundamental categories by which
humans model the (for them) observable world such as space, time, matter and so
forth, are the results of a long process of human reﬂexion rather than properties that
would be really available in the world and exist even when no human beings would
be around. We thus take what is called the “realistic” position (although it would
be more precise to call it “actualistic” instead), meaning that we believe there is a
world which is constituted independently of human beings. But we also believe that
human beings can never understand the whole truth of worldly existence in the sense
that we can never completely realize how the world really is. We can only see how
the world is actually for us. (The word “us” includes all possible humans that live on
other planets in the universe having in common their biological constitution in terms
of carbon and water.) To utilize a concept of Spinoza’s: We observe modality, but not
reality proper.
If so, we introduce a hierarchy of forms of existence (types of being) such that
everything which is according to our observation (in the terminology of Heidegger’s
this is an ontic concept) must have been possible beforehand. Hence, what we usually
call existence is the permanent transition of possibility into actuality. In other words:
There is a ﬁeld of possibilities out of which the actual (i.e. modality) is emerging.
Because the universe is not necessarily ergodic (i.e. not all available possibilities must
be actualized eventually), the number of available possibilities is considerably larger
than the number of actualized possibilities. So in order to produce actual objects
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in the observable world, emergence takes place such that from the beginning on,
there is a choice. There is always a choice, if the number of available possibilities
is larger than the number of actualized possibilities. The spontaneous emergence of
conﬁgurations of forms (structures) represents thus a selection from a number of
possible conﬁgurations. Hence, because there is this obvious discrepancy between
what there could be and what there actually is, we can call this a ﬁrst diﬀerence. It
is in this sense that we can utilize the formulation of Bateson’s: Information is the
diﬀerence which makes a diﬀerence. If in particular, we discuss the initial emergence
which is the emergence of the universe altogether, considering the latter as a maximal
system then, we can conclude that information must be present from the beginning
on because initial emergence is grounded in a ﬁrst choice.
2 The physical perspective
Note however that we have deﬁned physical quantities as something which is episte-
mologically intrinsic to the world we observe. Hence, on the level of the ﬁeld of possi-
bilities, they cannot be identical with what we have introduced within the framework
of physical theories. In the following we call energy-mass in physical terms (referring
to their equivalence but qualitative diﬀerence) matter for simplicity (and in order to
ﬁnd the connection to philosophical tradition). While the dual pair entropy-structure
will be called information for short. These dual pairs have been discussed recently in
more detail elsewhere [1]. As far as we can treat these quantities in physical terms
(which also includes the performance of experiments in the laboratory), they are part
of our observable world. But they are not part of the ﬁeld of possibilities in the ﬁrst
place. In other words: As seen under the perspective of the latter, they are modal
projections rather of what there really is. But for the purpose of technical applica-
tions, this conceptual viewpoint suﬃces (for daily use, so to speak), and the physicist
asks whether it is functioning after all. The philosopher however, has to ask for the
conceptual foundations, also. And because we aim here at an approach which shall
produce deﬁnitions of concepts, we have to take the position of the philosopher so
that in the end, the ontological diﬀerence is not trivial at all.
We notice now: Both energy-mass (matter) and entropy-structure (information),
respectively, must be present from the beginning on. The one is providing the
capacity to let something emerge at all, the other is providing the rules that tell
what might actually emerge and how. It does not matter here that what we call
matter and information might turn out to be mere projections of something which
is much more fundamental and cannot be observed and conceptualized properly by
us in principle, because we simply reﬂect about these concepts according to our cog-
nitive capacity and as far as it goes. As to the sceptical part of this reﬂexion it is
suﬃcient then that applications work in the end, but as to the speculative part of
this reﬂexion we might even gain some new heuristic insight which is a kind of excess
capacity [2].
The philosophical tradition tells us that we can call the ground of our observable
world substance. Hence, matter and information turn out to be those two attributes
by which we can gain access to substance. Note that the transition from the non-
observable world to the observable world (from the possible into the actual) secures
the continuity of conceptual functions: It is loops in the sense of quantum gravity that
by their energy as well as entropy processing fulﬁl the deﬁnition of agents as given
by Stuart Kauﬀman some time ago. On the most fundamental level of physics (at
the Planck scale), six loops actually co-operate in order to form a hexagonal segment
of the underlying spin network. It is this spin network which deﬁnes the level where
space and time themselves are quantized. The hexagonal pattern is not at all arbitrary
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here, because its formal structure secures the relevance of the famous transformation
group SL (2, C). On the one hand, this guarantees the well-known relationships of
relativistic and quantum physics, on the other, this demonstrates the isomorphism of
the spin network with what we can call a quantum computer. In other words, already
on the most fundamental level of physics does the universe as maximal system show
up in terms of information, though this is not classical information as we know it –
instead, it is quantum information.
This result remains invariant when looking for higher levels of evolution: going
from the Planck scale upward to the Compton scale, to the Schwarzschild scale and
further up to chemical, biological and other structures. Somewhere in between the
Compton scale and the Schwarzschild scale, the transition to classicity takes place
due to the order of magnitudes encountered. A uniﬁed methodology which is able to
grasp all the important aspects of this overall view in terms of substantial attributes
called matter and information, respectively, has been recently provided by category
theory, or more precisely: by a variant of it called topos theory. I have discussed this
point in detail within the works quoted so far.
3 Outlook: Diﬀerentiating the concepts
Recently, Carlo Rovelli has introduced an argument which is very much in favour of
what we have done here already [3]. Although he comes very quickly to living struc-
tures within the observable world, the generalized concept of “relative information”
appears to be very helpful for physical systems after all: The idea is that if we have
two systems A and B, respectively, that can be in states NA and NB , then without
any constraints, the interactive complex (A, B) can be in states NA × NB . However,
practically all possible systems are subject to constraints. Hence, the real bundle
of possible states is described by some NAB such that this is strictly smaller than
NA × NB . Rovelli says then that for such a case “A and B have information about
one another”, and that this information is given by S = log (NA × NB) – log NAB . We
can see clearly that this conception is also true for what we have said above, about
the initial emergence of the universe. And we see also why from the beginning on, we
have to deal with systems at all: This is because evolution happens in an organized
way, and organization is always systematic and based on information (and the mate-
rial capacity to actualize). Hence, it is even the title of Rovelli’s contribution which
points into the direction of what we would like to aim at here.
If, on the other hand, we start from our preliminary deﬁnition of systems as given
in [1], we note the relevance of the deﬁnition of interactions for what we are talking
about. The deﬁnition is: “We call system a network of interacting agents producing a
space with a well-deﬁned boundary that is open in the sense of thermodynamics” [4].
Obviously, diﬀerent from the tradition of talking about interactions in physics so far,
what we have to do is to visualize interactions more closely in terms of constraints and
relative information transport. Hence, we have not yet achieved the original objective:
namely to deﬁne matter and information properly, demonstrate their constitutive role
as to systems, and represent the results in terms of a uniﬁed theory with a closed
methodology. This remains to be done in more detail. One step forward could be to
attempt a deﬁnition for the concept of information based on a similar proposition
to the one which is oﬀered by Noether’s theorem in the case of energy. However, a
ﬁrst condition for something like this would be a clariﬁcation of the question whether
entropy-structure would be conserved after all, while entropy alone is not [5]. The
ongoing work is being continued.
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